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An Analysis of the November 9, 1971 Referendum 
Vote on Rapid Transit In Fulton County 
.ABRAHAM L. DA VIS 
MMehouse Coll,ege 
The primary purpose of this study is to analyze the November 9, 
1971 referendum vote on Rapid Transit in Fulton County. Such an 
analysis is worthy of careful examination for five reasons. In the first 
place, by examining the November 9, 1971 referendum vote, it will be 
possible to pinpoint some of the important independent variables that 
played a role in causing a number of voters to change their minds in 
favor of rapid transit compared to their rejection of such transit in 
Fulton County on November 5, 1968. 
Second, an examination of the successful 1971 referendum vote will 
provide rapid transit decision-makers in other metropolitan areas with 
some insight as to the type of decision-making conducive to gaining voter 
approval of rapid transit. 
Third , by analyzing the 1971 refer endum vote in Fulton County, it 
will be possible to make generalizations about voting behavior on the 
issue of rapid transit and the strategies the rapid transit decision-makers 
utilized to maximize their chances of reaching stated policy objectives. 
Fourth, an examination of the aforementioned referendum is worthy 
of inquiry because the results have been challenged in the courts. The 
referendum was approved by the voters in Fulton County by only a 471 
vote margin and many questions were raised immediately following the 
outcome of the election . 
Finally, the referendum vote in Fulton County is important because 
blacks make up aproximately thirty-three perc ent of the eligible voters. 
Therefore, since race is still a big issue in local politics, it will be interest-
ing to examine how black and white voters respond to an important local 
rapid transit referendum. 
On Novemb er 5, 1968, the voters rejected the mass transit bond 
referendum for the metropolitan Atlanta area. The plan that the voters 
were asked to approve consisted of "a four corridor, fixed rail , rapid 
transit system of 40.3 miles in length," 1 at a cost of $750 million dollars, 
1 Matthew Coogan, James Landon , James Row, Alan Row, Alan Rubin, and 
Edmund Schaffer, Transportation Politics in Atlanta: The Mass Transit Bond Refer-
endum of Novemb er, 1968 ( Cambridge: Harvard University) p. 4. 
1 
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exclusive of interest. Modem air-conditioned vehicles designed to reach 
speeds in excess of 70 m.p.h. were a part of the plan. The voters were 
also promised park-and-ride stations in th e outlying areas and feeder bus 
service. The proposed system called for approximat ely thirty stations, 
five of which would be underground. It is important to note that the 
plan 2 was for the system to lie entirely within Fulton and DeKalb Coun-
ties with long-range plans to provide services to Clayton and Gwinnett 
Counties, which were also participating members of MARTA. 
The cost of the system was to be paid by the Federal governm ent, the 
State of Georgia and the local governments involved. It was estimat ed 
that the contributions from the Federal government and the state of 
Georgia added up to about half of the cost, with the participating local 
governments supplying approximately $377.6 million dollars.3 An increase 
in the ad valorem property tax was the method agreed upon for the 
local governments to fulfill their financial obligations. 
The plan was defeated at the polls with a 42.8% affirmative vote; 
whereas an affirmative vote of over 50% was required for adoption in each 
voting locality. The referendum results were as follows: 
Jurisdiction For 
I. City of Atlanta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38,675 
2. Fulton County 
( excluding Atlanta) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14,619 
3. DeKalb County 
( excluding Atlanta) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32,568 
TOTALS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85,862 
Against 
53,660 
25,871 
35,397 
114,928 
Source: Matthew Coogan, James Landon, James Row, Alan Rubin and Edmund 
SchaHer, Transportation Politics in At'lanta: The Mass Transit Bond 
Referendum of November, 1968 ( Cambridge: Harvard University, 
1970), p. 122. 
It is interesting to note that blacks overwhelmingly voted against the 
1968 referendum . They felt, as did many community leaders, that the 
plan was not responsive to their needs and was designed primarily to 
benefit whites living in the suburban areas. Only two public hearings 
were held in the black communities prior to the 1968 referendum! This 
caused great resentment and solidified black opposition to a plan that 
failed to consider, in a meaningful way, the needs and suggestions of a 
potentially significant black vote. 
2 The 40.3 mile plan was presented in a number of excellent public relations 
brochures which were prepar ed by MARTA's Director of Information. 
3 Coogan, Landon, Row, Rubin and ScbaHer, p. 94. 
4 Interview with Morris Dillard, MARTA's former Community Relations Direc-
tor, on April 6, 1971. At the present time, Mr. Dillard is the Executive Assistant to 
the General Manager of MARTA. 
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Many whites also voted against rapid transit because the MARTA 
Board of Directors failed to consult with the regionally elected officials 
on a continuous basis and failed to gain their support for the proposed 
PB-T-B Plan 5 following the year of technical decision-making. This fail-
ure occurred because the board of directors had developed the rapid 
transit plan on a largely technical level and never had intentions of "going 
to each locality and determine how best to maximize support for the 
system, either from the local elected officials or from the populace itself ."6 
Thus, the influential community leaders failed to campaign enthusiastically 
for the proposal because they felt that they had been left out of the plan-
ning stages. The approach to decision-making meant that technical deci-
sions were being made which did not take into account diverse community 
feelings, especially those feelings within the black community . For ex-
ample, on the morning following the election, The Atlanta Constitution 
carried an article entitled "Rapid Transit Trails Except in DeKalb Vote." 
The author of the article made the following observation: 
Negroes linked the transit proposal with their opposition to Atlanta 
school bond proposals and said that in neither were they guaranteed 
enough service and, in the case of rapid transit, participation. 7 
On November 7, an article by Dick Herbert and Alex Coffin ap-
peared in The Atlanta Constitution entitled, "Board to Meet Today on 
Future of MARTA." In that article, Mayor Ivan Allen said: 
In the future . . . I will attempt to restructure the rapid transit 
authority in an effort to make it more representative of city-wide 
interests. 
Then I will ask them immediately to restudy the route structure to 
make it more acceptable to all Atlantans, who, of course, are the 
main beneficiaries of the system ( p. 7). 
Following voter rejection of the 1968 rapid transit referendum, the 
MARTA Board of Directors found themselves busy preparing to present 
a second rapid transit plan to the voters for their approval or rejection. 
It is important to note that the 1971 rapid transit plan differs from the one 
which was defeated at the polls in 1968 in the following five ways: 
5 PB-T-B is an amalgamation of three engineering firms, Parsons Brinkerhoff. 
Tudor-Bechtel, which contracted with MARTA approximately five months after it 
was formally organized, to prepare the rapid transit plan that was submitted to the 
electorate in 1968. 
6 Coogan, Landon, Row, Rubin and Schaffer, p. 62. 
7 Dick Herbert, "Rapid Transit Trails Except in DeKalb Vote," The Atlanta 
Constitution, November 6, 1968, p. 8. 
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1. Local financing based on the 1 % sales tax, rather than the ad 
valorem tax. 
2. Assurance of federal financing through the new Urban Mass 
Transit Assistance Act, enacted by Congress October 15, 1970. 
3. A dramatically expanded and fully coordinated bus system. 
4. The use of rapid busways. 
5. An expanded rail system. Ten legs covering 70 miles vs. Five legs 
covering 40 miles of rapid rails and rapid busways. 8 
The MARTA Board of Directors changed their aproach to de-
cision-making in at least three significant ways to enhance the chance of 
voter approval of the second rapid transit referendum for the Metropolitan 
Atlanta area. In the first place, the MARTA Board of Directors made it 
very clear at their January 5, 1971 meeting that they unanimously ap-
proved of a meeting with the participating local governments in order 
that they would be aware of the definite role they would play in the de-
cision-making process, as far as rapid transit is concerned. The primary 
purpose of this meeting would be to have a discussion with the participat-
ing local government officials on the topic of how they felt the system 
should be financed. 
On January 7, 1971, officials from Atlanta, DeKalb, Fulton, Clayton, 
and Gwinnett Counties met, and there was a feeling on their part that 
they were an integral part of the decision-making process. Representa-
tives from each local government were called on to state their position on 
which method of financing a rapid, transit system would be in the best 
interest of the metropolitan area. It is the author's opinion that the 
MARTA Board of Directors made the most rational choice from among 
competing alternatives when it decided to make sure that all participating 
local governments would be involved in the decision-making process. 
After all, this had not happened before the 1968 referendum. 
Also, there is a requirement by the federal government that a Citizens' 
Transportation Advisory Committee be involved in the region's transporta-
tion planning and that the rapid transit decision-makers adequately con-
sider their viewpoints when crucial decisions are made. The rationale 
behind this approach is that the broadest possible base of community 
participation is needed in the decision-making proc ess when it affects the 
lives of citizens. Representation on: the committee is proportional to the 
population of the six jurisdictions. 9 Also, members of the committee are 
appointed by the Mayor of the City of Atlanta and the Chairman of the 
8 Rapid Transit: Facts, Figures and Future Plans, p. 7. 
9 The six jurisdictions are Clayton, Cobb, DeKalb, Fulton and Gwinnett Counties 
and the City of Atlanta. 
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five county governments. The breakdown of the sixty-man committee is 
as follows: 
Counties 
Clayton .... . ............ . ...... ... . 
Cobb ...... . ... . .................. . 
DeKalb ........................... . 
Fulton ..... . ... . ... .. ..... . ....... . 
Gwinnett .. . .... .. . . . .............. . 
Representatives % of Population 
4 
8 
17 
28 
( 23 in Atlanta and 5 in 
unincorporated Fulton 
County) 
3 
60 
6.2 
13.7 
27.8 
46.6 
4.7 
100.0 
NoTE: The above breakdown is based on ARMPC 1968 population estimates. 
The MARTA Board of Directors intentionally went on record strongly 
favoring citizen involvement in rapid transit decisions for the Metro-
politan Atlanta area. They even agreed to meet with the Citizens' Trans-
portation Advisory Committee and to consider their ideas and sugges-
tions, seriously. 
Finally, the MARTA Board of Directors decided unanimously that 
an intensive community relations campaign was a "must," especially in 
the black community since such a campaign was absent preceding the 
1968 referendum and since there was a general consensus that this failure 
was one of the factors that led to voter rejection of the proposed referen-
dum. A white man had been the public information officer preceding the 
1968 referendum. However, Morris Dillard, who is black, was the Com-
munity Relations Director in 1971. His staff was much stronger com-
pared to that of 1968 and the campaign for rapid transit was much more 
intensive. Eighte en public forums and a number of public hearings were 
held to allow "the people to tell MARTA what they want and need in 
a rapid transit system." The rationale behind these eighteen forums was 
to give the rapid transit consultants enough time to includ e th e inputs 
from these public forums in their report to the MARTA Board of Dir ec-
tors during the month of June, 1971. This report was actu ally a suggested 
rapid transit system for the Board's consideration. 
It cannot be overemphasiz ed that of the thre e strategic chan ges made 
by the MARTA Board of Dir ectors following the 1968 referendum, top 
priority was given to an intensive campaign for rapid transit which was 
carried to the Metro-Atlanta citizenry by means of TV, radio announce-
ments, newspapers ( such as The Atlanta Constitution, The Atlanta 
Journal, The Atlanta Inquirer and The Atlanta Daily News), public 
forums, brochur es, a MARTA Newsletter , black and white political lead-
ers, and school children. Form er Atlanta Alderman Everett Millican 
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pointed out that the campaign cost three quarters of one million dollars 
and was more propaganda than anything else.10 
Although many facets of the proposed rapid transit plan were pre-
sented to the voters, there can be no doubt that the major part of the cam-
paign effort centered around the proposed eye-catching fifteen-cent fare. 
For example, The Atlanta Constitution, The Atlanta Inquirer and cam-
paign literature by MARTA carried the following statements which are 
representative of what appeared time after time in the above sources be-
fore the November 9 referendum: 
Immediately upon the purchase of ATS by the Metropolitan Atlanta 
Rapid Transit Authority, cash fares in Fulton, DeKalb , Clayton and 
Gwinnett Counties will drop from the present 40 cents plus transfers 
to 15 cents, regardless of the length of the ride. 11 
The Black Community needs a 15 cent fare, we need increased serv-
ice, we need new and expanded routes, we need a strong employ-
ment program and we need the impact of 1.4 billion dollars.12 
Passage of the Rapid Transit Referendum on November 9 means the 
immediate purchase of the Atlanta Transit System, and a reduction 
in fare to 15 cents including transfers . . . The fare will be 15 
cents for the first 7 years with increases of only five cents in the 8th, 
9th, and 10th years. You will not have to pay for transfers. 13 
It cannot be overemphasized that the proposed fifteen-cent fare 14 for 
prosp ective users of the rapid transit system did cause some controversy. 
At a breakfast given by MARTA on June 17, 1971, State Senator Leroy 
Johnson withdrew his support for the system after accusing MARTA 
officials of deceiving him that the fare would remain at fifteen-cents for 
at least ten years.15 He made it clear that a fifteen-cent fare guaranteed 
for ten years was essential for black support. State Representative Ben 
Brown agreed with Johnson, who also stated that MARTA was guilty of 
"double talk." However, State Representative John Greer pointed out that 
the "impression of the fifteen-cent fare got out and the press picked it 
up ... ,, 
10 Statement by Everett Millican on WSB-TV, Channel 2, Atlanta, November 
9, 1971. 
11 Alex Coffin, "If Transit Wins, First Step Will Be Purchase of Bus System." 
The Atlanta Constitution, November 8, 1971, p. 15A. 
12 Dodson "Exposed As Anti-Pawn," The Atlanta Inquirer, October 30, 1971. 
p. 14. 
13 Rapid Transit: What Does It Mean?, p. 7. 
14 The 15 cent fare was essentially proposed by Atlanta Mayor Sam Massell. 
15 Alex Coffin, "Deceived on Transit Fare, Says Johnson," The Atlanta Constitu-
tion, June 18, 1971, p. llA. 
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Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson observed that if the news media was 
responsible for the misunderstanding, MARTA should have corrected it. 
MARTA Chairman Roy Blount said that the Authority would not proceed 
with public hearings on the proposed rapid transit plan until it got the 
green light from the public officials who attended the breakfast. 
In addition to the key demand of a guaranteed fifteen-cent fare for 
ten years, the black leaders in Atlanta confronted MARTA officials with 
twenty-six demands and made it clear that "further support of rapid 
transit hinges on how the white commm1ity responds" 16 to their demands. 
The following are representative of the list of demands presented to the 
MARTA officials: 
1. MARTA [should] see to it that its staff is at least thirty-five per 
cent black and that steps be taken to increase black membership 
on the MARTA Board ... 
2. Rail, not bus, service to the Northwest-Perry Homes area, 
3. Priority [given] to those depend ent on public transit. 
4. Public transit service from all inner city communities to major em-
ployment centers. 
5. High-speed rail service to Southwest Atlanta - Cascade Heights. 
6. No contract or agreement that prohibits or limits hiring or pro-
motion of persons because of race, sex and national origin. 
7. Provide at least thirty-five per cent of each service or goods con-
tract to minority firms and consultants. 
8. Adequately staffed equal employment office.17 
The outcome was a commitment by the MARTA Board of Directors 
of a fifteen-cent fare for seven instead of ten years, with a five-cent in-
crease until the fare reached thirty cents by 1982. An additional five-cent 
fare hike would occur in the eleventh and fifteenth years which would re-
turn the fare to forty cents. It was at this point that The Atlanta Inquirer, 
a black newspaper, and black leaders with the exception of Alderman 
Henry Dodson, decided to endorse the rapid transit plans and urged 
black voters to follow their lead, State Senators Leroy Johnson and Horace 
Ward, Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson, Alderman Q. V. Williamson, Ira 
Jackson and Marvin Arrington, State Representatives Ben Brown and 
Crace Hamilton were among the black elected officials who endorsed the 
plan. Representative Ben Brown represented the feelings of the black 
elected officials when he said: 
16 Raleigh Bryans, "26 Black Demands Given to MARTA." The Atlanta Journal, 
July 2, 1971, p. 2A. 
17 Ibid. 
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Those persons who oppose the referendum obviously have not given 
in-depth thought to what rapid transit is all about. If they had, they 
would clearly understand the significant benefits to be derived from 
the . . . system . . . 
I support MARTA this time because the Black Community has had 
significant input in the formulation of plans. When the issue came 
up before for a vote, I opposed it because we were not given the 
chance to put in that input. 18 
The opposition was led by Alderman Henry Dodson, Lieutenant 
Governor Lester Maddox and Former Alderman Everett Millican. It is 
interesting to note that Alderman Dodson centered his opposition cam-
paign primarily in the black community. It is the author's opinion that 
Dodson 's opposition campaign was basically ineffective because it was 
not well organized or coordinated. His major contention was and still is 
that MARTA is a "trick." 19 However, Dodson failed to back up his as-
sertions in a convincing manner. Moreover, when confronted by pro-
ponents of rapid transit to support his allegations with facts, Dodson's 
answers were vague. The end result was that blacks who were straddling 
the fence could not be persuaded to vote "No" due to an ineffective op-
position campaign. 
Lieutenant Governor Lester Maddox and former Alderman Everett 
Millican led the opposition campaign in the white community. Their cam-
paign was undoubtedly more organized and persuasive. Lyndon Wade, 
Direct or of the Atlanta Urban League and Secretary to MARTA, argued 
that blacks' confidence regarding the proposed fifteen-cent fare guarantee 
was undermined by white enemies of the rapid transit proposal 20 rather 
than by Dodson's opposition campaign. If Wade's analysis is correct, it 
simply points out the impact that an effective campaign can have on 
voters in contrast to an ineffective one. Lester Maddox stated his position 
in a one-quarter page ad which appeared in The Atlanta Constitution. 
He observed: 
I am convinced that those who vote for rapid transit on Novemb er 9, 
1971, will be only the uninformed, who have not been given the 
whole truth, the special interest groups and individuals who will be 
voting to protect their own investments and those who would make 
18 Ernest Pharr, "MARTA Vote Approval "Would Effect Greater Development'," 
The Atlanta Inquirer, October 23, 1971, P· 1 A. 
19 "Dodson Exposed as 'Anti-Pawn'', p. 14. 
20 Raleigh Bryans, "Rapid Transit Gets Green Light In Fulton.DeKalb Cliff-
Hanger," The Atlanta Journal, November 10, 1971, p. 20 A. 
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millions of dollars from the expenditure of hundreds of millions of 
dollars not needed for such development . . . 
I urge the voters to ... vote No until state, and local government, 
and MARTA officials, come up with a plan that will assure as much 
interest in protecting the wage earners and the taxpayers as present 
proposals assure gain for the freeloaders, some politicians, special 
interest groups and individuals who would make millions of dollars.21 
Everett Millican, Chairman of the Committee Opposed to MARTA 
emphasized in his opposition campaign that MARTA would become a 
super government and that the fifteen-cent fare was a political gimmick 
to attract voters. 22 it is interesting to note that Lester Maddox and Everett 
Millican were given much more news coverage in their opposition cam-
paign than Henry Dodson. This indicates that the white press is more in-
clined to give greater news coverage to what influential whites have to 
say on important issues of public concern. Moreover, black voters are 
forced to make up their minds on public issues from a white dominated 
press and the white viewpoint. 
On November 9, 1971, after almost every conceivable argument had 
been made for and against rapid transit, the voters in Fulton, DeKalb, 
Clayton and Gwinnett Counties were given their opportunity to express 
how they felt. The outcome of the election was as follows: 
Counties For 
Fulton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55,736 
DeKalb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39,565 
Clayton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,300 
Gwinnett . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,500 
Source: The Atlanta Constitution, November 10, 1971, p. IA. 
Against 
53,725 
36,207 
11,147 
9,506 
Clayton and Gwinnett Counties rejected the proposal, while Fulton 
and DeKalb Counties approved it. Approval was absolutely necessary in 
the two latter counties for the project to go forward. According to the 
law, a second referendum could be held in Clayton and Gwinnet Counties 
by December 31, 1972. Forty-three and three-tenths per cent of the voters 
or 211, 686 of the 488,300 eligible voters cast ballots in the four counties. 
Mayor Charles Summerday of Clayton County observed that 
MART A's decision to cut out a portion of a rail line to his county in order 
that another line could extend to the black Perry Home area in Atlanta 
21 An Ad entitled "Vote 'No' On Rapid Transit," which appeared in the Atlanta 
Constitution, November 8, 1971, p. 4C. 
22 
"Everett Millican: MARTA Power Goes Too Far," The Atlanta Constitution, 
November 8, 1971, p. IA. 
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was one factor which resulted in voter rejection of the proposal in this 
surburban county. The residents of this county felt sh·ongly that they 
were not getting their money's worth. However, in Gwinnett County, the 
proposal was rejected because a number of people felt that they were not 
going to receive enough benefits quickly enough. Gwinnett County Com-
missioner Garvis Williams pointed out that the users of the transit system 
should be "willing to pay for it rather than having it subsidized by the 
taxpayers." 28 There was a majority vote against rapid transit in every 
Clayton and Gwinnett County precinct. Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson 
said that whites in Clayton and Gwinnett Counties voted overwhelmingly 
against rapid transit because of their fear of blacks moving into these 
localities. 
In DeKalb County, the voters approved of rapid transit by a 3,358 
vote margin. It should be pointed out, however, that voters in South 
DeKalb defeated the proposal in almost every precinct, while the heavily 
populated northern precincts approved it. The commuters in DeKalb pro-
vided the bulk of "yes" votes. 
In Fulton County, the voters approved of rapid transit by a narrow 
margin of 2,011 votes which was less than the margin in DeKalb County. 
However, by November 11, 1971, the margin of victory had been reduced 
to a mere 461 votes as a result of the vote totals in each precinct being 
recounted. The margin of victory was less than one-half of one per cent 
of the 107,115 votes cast. The first vote tabulation in Fulton County ap-
peared in The A{lanta Constitution on November 10, 1971, as follows: 
For Against 
55,736 53,725 
The vote tabulation following the recount of the precinct by precinct 
totals was: 
For Against 
55,760 53,299 
The supervisor of elections pointed out that errors had been made as the 
precinct by precinct vote totals were transposed to the board following 
the election. At this point, people from all walks of life throughout Fulton 
County became suspicious and distrustful of the election outcome. The 
result was a suit filed by Atlanta Attorney M. Henderson and his wife 
2s Alex Coffin, "Voters in Fulton, DeKalb O'Kay Rapid Transit Plans," The 
Atlanta Constitution, November 10, 1971, p. 24A. 
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challenging the MARTA election. They had voted against rapid transit 
and contended that a recount would show that a majority of the voters 
rejected rapid transit for the Metro-Atlanta area. Superior Court Judge 
Jefferson Davis of Cartersville was called in to hear the case and said "I 
think they are entitled to a recount." By midnight of November 29, 1971, 
the ballots had been recounted by mostly college students from Georgia 
Tech, Georgia State University and the Atlanta University Center. Judge 
Davis permitted only representatives for MARTA and the Hendersons in 
the room where the recount took place. The recount failed to upset 
MARTA's narrow margin of victory. Judge Davis announced that 53,793 
voters favored rapid transit while 53,322 voters opposed it.24 The margin 
of victory had increased by ten votes over tl1e original count. Thus, Fulton 
County voters had approved of rapid transit by a 471 vote margin rather 
than the original 461 vote margin. 
Nevertheless, the cloud of doubt remained following the recount 
because Atlanta Attorney Moreton Rolleston was handling two other suits 
challenging the MARTA victory. Terrell Hill, the Deputy General Man-
ager of MARTA admitted that "the cloud is still there." The one per cent 
sales tax could not be levied in Fulton and DeKalb Counties to finance 
construction of the rapid transit system until all challenges had been 
cleared. Attorney Henderson was not satisfied with the recount and 
pointed out that a significant number of printed ballots which had been 
issued to poll managers, were not accounted for. He said "I think I am 
absolutely right in asking for an accounting of all the ballots." 26 Hender-
son then filed a suit against the Fulton County Commission and the 
Georgia Revenue Commissioner, John Blackmon, to block collection of 
taxes for MARTA because in his opinion, the election was invalid. In 
October, 1972, Fulton County Superior Court Judge Jack Etheridge ruled 
in favor of MART A's motion to dismiss the case. Judge Etheridge seemed 
to have been influenced by a MARTA attorney who said that the Au-
thority had spent or committed 23.5 million since last spring. 
On February 14, 1972, Attorney Moreton Rolleston appealed the suit, 
which had been dismissed by U. S. District Judge Sidney 0. Smth on 
December 1, 1971, to the Fifth U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals. The ap-
pellants were Atlanta Alderman Henry Dodson and former Alderman 
Everett Millican. "The Millican-Dodson case charges voting irregularities, 
intimidation of voters by pro-rapid transit workers passing out literature 
at the polls, and the lack of constitutionally guaranteed due process of 
24 Beau Cutts, "MARTA Is Winner by 471 in Recount," The Atlanta Constitu-
tion, November 30, 1971, p. IA. 
25 Beau Cutts, "Appeal on MARTA is Studied," The Atlanta Constitution, De-
cember 1, 1971, p. IA. 
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law in State Courts." 26 The appeal seeks to void the November 9, 1971 
rapid transit referendum in Fulton County. Despite all this activity, 
MARTA's Attorney, Steve Huie, advised rapid transit officials to proceed 
with their plans despite the pending court challenge. 
It must be pointed out that a majority of blacks who cast ballots on 
November 9, 1971, voted for rapid transit and were responsible for rapid 
transit being approved in Fulton County. At a City Hall press conference 
following the election, Vice Mayor Maynard Jackson expressed the posi-
tion of Atlanta's Black Coalition when he observed that "the black com-
munity is responsible for the MART A victory .... The black vote made 
the difference in this referendum." 21 The coalition's analysis of the elec-
tion returns showed "that blacks voted 55.3 per cent in favor of MART A, 
while whites voted only 49.3 per cent in favor." 28 
Although it is difficult to determine without an extensive survey just 
how much impact the intensive campaign concerning the fifteen-cent fare 
had on the voters in generaL there can be no doubt that many poor black 
and white voters supported rapid transit primarily because of the desir-
able fare which MARTA promised. A sixty cent savings per day might 
not mean that much to people in the higher salary brackets, but for poor 
blacks and whites, this is a significant savings and an economic blessing. 
It should be noted that since the fare was lowered to fifteen cents on 
March 1, 1972, patronage increased 18.5 per cent after the first week, ac-
cording to Alan Klepper, the new General Manager of MARTA. More-
over, William Maynard, former Assistant General Manager for System 
Operations, stated that "there has been a substantial increase in riders 
during off-peak hours and on Sunday, and a significant increase in short-
distance riding has occurred." 29 Thus, the approval of a rapid transit 
system by Fulton County voters can be largely explained by economic 
factors. Poor blacks and whites were interested in a sixty cent savings 
per day and middle class blacks and whites could not feel the effect of a 
one cent sales tax on their pocketbooks. After all, it was these same people 
who rejected the proposed rapid transit system, which would have been 
financed by an ad valorem property tax, in 1968. 
It can not be overemphasized that rapid transit decision-makers in 
the city of Seattle should examine the method proposed for financing · 
the mass transit system in the Metro-Atlanta area very carefully because 
the voters in that city have twice defeated proposals for a rapid transit 
26 Alex Coffin, "Court To Hear MARTA Appeal Case," The Atlanta Constitution, 
February 12, 1972, p. 6B. 
27 Bill Seddon, "Blacks Claim Credit for MARTA Win," The Atlanta Constitu-
tion, November 11, 1971, p. 13A. 
28 Jbid. 
20 "15¢ Fare Attracts Citizens," Atlanta Daily World, March 19, 1972, p. I. 
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system. Virginia Hetrick and Hugh Calkins found in their study of 
Seattle that the economic status of voters or what they call "nontrans-
portation factors" were largely responsible for voter rejection of the 
proposals on two occasions. They wrote: 
. . . While the proponents of the transit plan considered the lower 
and middle income groups to be the important swing vote, the 
upper income areas showed the greatest disaffections. The losses 
in suburban communities may be attributable to two factors among 
others: tax-sensitivity and cutbacks in the aerospace industry. Just 
prior to the 1970 election, information on local property taxes show 
that two of the east-side communities had the highest property taxes 
in the state. Cutbacks in the aerospace employment during the six 
months previous to the 1970 election were heavily concentrated in 
residential areas east and south of Lake Washington . . . 
Voter response to general obligation bond elections is a function of 
economic characteristics of the population and the general state of 
the economy. It does not appear that factors such as need for im-
provements in the transportation system or anticipated levels of 
service influence voting behavior. 30 
It is interesting to note that voter response to the rapid transit pro-
posal in Fulton County was also largely influenced by economic factors 
rather than "transportation factors ." 
A majority of the black precincts had voted for rapid transit although 
the margin of victory in a number of these precincts was very narrow. 
The following is a sample of such precincts: 
SE 
SJ 
3M 
6H 
7D 
7Z 
9A 
9B 
Precincts 
Morris Brown College .. .. . . .. . .. . .. . . ... .. . . 
Harper High School ....... . . ..... ... . . . .. . . 
Archer High School . . .... . ... . . . ..... . . ... . 
Howard High School .. .... ..... .. .. . ... ... . 
Washington High School . .. . .... . ... . . . .... . 
Fred erick Douglas . .... . . ... . . .. . . ... .. .. . . 
Morehouse College Gym ..... . . ....... . .... . 
En glish Avenue Primary School .. 
For 
163 
704 
142 
194 
361 
531 
227 
277 
Source: The Atlanta Constitution. Novemb er 10, 1971, page 7C. 
Against 
136 
582 
136 
100 
249 
414 
144 
212 
Although a majority of voting blacks favored rapid transit, it should 
be pointed out that the turnout in black inner-city precincts was very 
low ( approximat ely thirty-five per cent, compared with an over-all forty-
ao Virginia Hetrick and Hugh Calkins, "Urban Mass Transportation in Seattle: 
A Behavioral Analysis of Special Election Results", Proceedings of the Association 
of American Geographers, Volume 4, 1972, p. 43. 
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three per cent). This proven lack of black voting on this vital issue is 
due in part to the inability of Atlanta's black leadership to bring the 
diverse elements in the black community together. Such a low turnout 
is not only indicative of the very low level of political participation on 
the part of blacks on important policy issues, but is also indicative of 
why it is so easy for decision-makers to carry through important decisions 
that are not representative of community sentiment and be able to get 
away with it. This situation is unfortunate and will exist for a long 
time due to the following reasons: 
1. Black leaders in Atlanta are not vocal enough when it comes to 
pushing for policies that are beneficial to black people. There 
seems to be a feeling among some black leaders in Atlanta that 
keeping quiet or not being too vocal will somehow result in 
policies that will be beneficial to black people. The evidence 
suggests that if this is the assumption upon which they have 
been operating, it has been an erroneous one. The end result is 
a feeling among the masses of black people that there is not much 
hope and that to pedorm their civic responsibility is a futile 
activity. 
2. The type of black voting power that is needed to affect basic 
policy changes that will be beneficial to black people is non-
existent in almost all sections of Georgia as well as the entire 
country. A minority of blacks casting votes in an election is 
almost meaningless in a maforitarian context. A problem which 
will continually face black people involves black leaders being 
a minority on nearly all decision-making bodies working to get 
truly liberal proposals passed that will benefit the masses of 
blacks. This problem is magnified in Atlanta. For example, Floyd 
Hunter found in his study of the Altanta power structure that 
"in no case may the Negro citizen break out of the pyramids into 
the upper echelons of policy-making groupings at the top of the 
total community structure. This is the general pattern of par-
ticipation of the Negro Community in thei power pattern in 
Altanta." 81 From my observations, this particular conclusion by 
Hunter is still valid although his study was written nine years ago. 
3. The majority of poor blacks are so busy "making ends meet" 
that even vital political issues affecting them directly are viewed 
with apathy . 
Sl Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure A Study of Decision-Making, 
Garden City, New York, Doubleday and Company, Incorporated, 1963, p. 146. 
REFERENDUM VOTE ON RAPID TRANSIT IN FULTON OOUNTY 15 
4. Many black people take a fatalistic attitude toward their plight 
and are convinced that there is nothing they can do to change it. 
Numerous unfuIBlled promises resulting from institutionalized 
white racism are largely responsible for this "there is nothing I 
can do" attitude. 
5. Many blacks in Fulton County feel that although there is a trans-
portation problem, they will still be able to get to and from work, 
and therefore, fail to become very concerned about a rapid transit 
system which they do not perceive as being directly beneficial to 
them. The author is convinced that until the transportation 
problem becomes far worse than it is now, there will continue 
to be a low level of political activity in the black community on 
this issue. 
It is the author's opinion after a careful analysis that the business 
element especially in the white community solidified its support for rapid 
transit because of the financial rewards that would accrue from it. For 
example, a piece of MARTA campaign literature pointed out that "since 
rapid transit was completed in Toronto 15 years ago, 85% of all new con-
struction: apartments, offices, homes . . . has occurred along the transit 
corridor ... Throughout Atlanta's history, the city's growth has followed 
its transportation routes ." 82 The same article also made the following 
observation: 
When construction starts in 1973, it will have a major economic 
impact on the entire region. Close to 300 architects and engineers 
will be required, 30 major contractors and 150 sub-contractors. 
The manpower demand will vary from year to year, with a peak 
payroll of some 3,000 construction workers . . . 820 carpenters, 
530 ironworkers, 450 laborers, 350 electricians, engineers, pipe fitters, 
sheet metal workers and many more . . . Local building material 
suppliers will probably have to hire an additional 900 workers to 
fill MARTA's needs. 83 
It is important to recall here that The Atlanta Inquirer and Atlanta's 
black leadership with the exception of Alderman Dodson urged black 
voters in Fulton County to support rapid transit in spite of the great 
degree of uncertainty surrounding the promised fifteen-cent fare for at 
least seven years. For example, Stell Huie, the Attorney for MARTA, 
pointed out that the fifteen-cent fare would have to be increased before 
s2 Rapid Transit: Facts and Figures, p. I. 
ss Ibid. 
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the seven years are up if the "assumptions and proj ections" put forth by 
the engineers do not hold up. This fare is only "established policy" and 
a "good faith commitment," 34 according to Huie, because state law 
prohibits MARTA from going into the red, which might happ en with 
such a low fare. Moreover, former Alderman Ev erett Millican observed: 
The 15 cent fare is nothing in the world [but a political gimmick] 
to try to attract some voters. As a matter of fact, some of th e MARTA 
people told me that. The 15 cent fare is twice as cheap as any other 
rapid transit system in North America. MARTA's own figures show 
that th ey will have an operating deficit for the first 15 years of $478 
million or an average of more than $30 million a year, which will 
come out of the sales tax. Other cities that are charging far more 
than MARTA are having deficits ranging from $100 million in New 
York, $51 million in Boston and $32 million in Chicago and in many 
of th ese areas there are less people riding rapid tr ansit now than 
rode it 40 years ago. 85 
Finally, Gerald Rafshoon, an advertising executive who aided 
MARTA in promoting its rapid transit proposal observed th at the "15 
cent fare, became a code word for 'nigg er'." 36 
It is the author's opinion that black leaders in Fulton County ought 
to be very cautious about urging blacks to vote a certain way on policies 
that are uncertain in their outcome and likely to have an adverse effect 
in the long run. The uncertainty regarding a guarante ed fifteen-cent 
fare for seven years might result in blacks paying more than a fifteen-
cent fare before seven years, plus the one cent sales tax. For example, 
the proposed fifteen-cent fare went into effect on March 1, 1972. How-
ever, as a result of an appeal by Attorney Ben Camp which was heard 
March 15, 1972, by the Georgia Supreme Court challenging the rapid 
transit legislation, uncertainty has already become a living reality. 
MARTA officials asserted that the fares would probably have had to 
return to the forty-cent level by April 1, 1972, since the collection of 
the one-cent sales tax which was to begin April 1, 1972, was halted by 
Camp's suit. William Maynard, former Assistant General Manager for 
System Operations estimated that deficits would run at the rate of ap-
proximately $600,000 monthly without the one-cent sales tax and a 
fifteen-cent far e. Roy Blount, MARTA Chairman, emph asized that "right 
34 Alex Coffin, "15 Cent Fare Not Assured," The Atlanta Constitution, Septem-
ber 14, 1971, p. lOA. 
85 Th e Atlanta Constitution, November 8, 1971, p . 15A. 
36 Raleigh Bryans, "Rapid Transit Gets Green Light in Fulton-D eKalb Cliff-
Hanger ," The Atlanta Constitution, November 10, 1971, p. 20A. 
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now we don't know enough to decide. But no one on the MARTA Board 
wants to create any more confusion than has already been created." 
Another example of black leaders failing to do their homework and 
failing to look out for their constituents' interest before urging them to 
vote a certain way centers around the proposed one cent sales tax. The 
Georgia Revenue Department under its new rules decided that the 
one cent sales tax for MARTA would be collected by adding one penny 
to the tax collected in each bracket under the present three per cent 
state sales tax law which operates as follows: 
11 to 35 cents ............... . ............ ( one cent is charged) 
36 to 66 cents ..................... .. .... . ( two cents are charged) 
67 to 100 cents . . .... . ... .. ...... . .. .. . . . . ( three cents are charged) 
NoTE: Under these rules, 2 cents would be charged for 11 to 35 cent purchases, 
3 cents from 36 to 66 cent purchases and 4 cents for 67 to one dollar 
purchases. 
In effect, consumers will pay an additional penny for rapid transit 
on each purchase of a dollar or less. 
Two Georgia trade associations have charged, and correctly so, 
that "this method of figuring the tax collections will constitute an eco-
nomic threat of unrestrained taxation as it will affect the disadvantaged 
and low-income population who must buy food-not from week to week, 
not from day to day-but from meal to meal." 37 It is common knowledge 
that the low-income population purchases many items one at a time . 
Thus, the purchase of a fifteen-cent soft drink is subject to a two cent 
sales tax ( 13.3 per cent) and a thirty-seven-cent quart of milk is subject 
to a three cent sales tax ( 8.1 per cent). 
John Blackmon, the State Revenue Commissioner, has pointed out 
that the brackets are aligned the way they are because Georgia does 
not have a four per cent tax, but a three per cent sales tax and a one 
per cent rapid transit tax. 
The Georgia Association of Petroleum Retailers Incorporated pointed 
out that the one per cent MARTA tax discriminates against "middleman'' 
businessmen such as manufacturer's representatives, because the mer-
chandise they sell is subject to the one per cent tax. Moreover, the 
Association pointed out that the bracket system produces an excess 
amount of taxes because it is not consistent with the MARTA law. The 
author has talked with a number of blac~ people from all walks of life 
who voted for rapid transit because they thought they would be paying 
an additional penny for every dollar spent rather than a penny for every 
37 
"Hearing Requested On Collection Rules," The Atlanta Journal, March 20, 
1972, p. 1. 
18 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 
purchase of one dollar or less. This is the type of uncertainty that could 
have been cleared up by black leaders before urging their constituents 
to vote "yes" for a rapid transit system. 
As a result of pressure regarding the method of collecting the one 
cent sales tax for MARTA being brought to bear by consumers, the 
Georgia Retail Food Dealers Association, the Atlanta Retail Merchants 
Association, and the Georgia Association of Petroleum Retailers, the 
Revenue Commissioner backed down and on March 30, 1972, one day 
before the tax was to go into effect, issued the following breakdown 
for collecting the tax: 
0-10 cents-none (same as three per cent tax) 
11-35 cents-one cent ( same as three per cent tax) 
36-66 cents-three cents ( one cent more than three per cent tax) 
67-$1.10-four cents (one cent more than three per cent tax) 
For purchases $1.11 and over, the combined tax is a flat four cents on the 
dollar, plus the additional cent or cents on fractional parts of a dollar ( as 
specified in the above brackets). 
Source: The Atlanta Constitution, April 2, 1972, page lA. 
On April 1, 1972, confusion was widespread as merchants began 
to collect the one-cent tax and overcharging was the rule rather than 
the exception for several days because many merchants had not been 
notified about the new tax collection ruling which was issued on March 
30, 1972. The author was the victim of a one-cent overcharge on April 
1, 1973, in the Sears and Roebuck Department Store located on Lee 
Street, in Atlanta. The store had been operating under the old rules and 
workers were only instructed to abide by the new ruling after the author 
brought this matter to the attention of the store manager who had to 
call the Revenue Commissioner's office to learn of the new ruling for 
the first time. The one-cent tax overcharge was returned to me, but 
many people who had shopped in the store earlier and were not cognizant 
of the new ruling were overcharged on April 1, 1972. An article in The 
Atlanta Constitution the day following the first day of collecting the one 
cent sales tax was entitled "Confusion Widespread As Transit Tax Starts," 
The author of that article wrote: 
They started collecting the 1 per cent sales tax and use tax for 
Atlanta's rapid transit system Saturday, and confusion abounded ... 
There had been a change in the local option tax structure late 
Thursday, and many stores and restaurants reported Saturday they 
still lacked official notification from the state . . . 
However, because many merchants Saturday had not been advised 
of Thursday's new ruling, they were unintentionally overcharging 
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on purchases of 11 through 35 cents, and on bills more than $1 when 
the fractional part of the dollar lay in the 11-35 cent range. 
"I had to pay 22 cents for a 20 cent cup of coffee at the Atlanta 
airport," said one enraged customer. 
"I just bought groceries" complained another Atlantan, "They 
charged me $4.26, but it should have been $4.25." 38 
C onclus-ions 
On November 9, 1971, voters in Fulton County approved a rapid 
transit system for the Metro Atlanta area by a margin of 471 votes in 
what turned out to be a very controversial election. Several lawsuits 
challenging the election outcome were pending at the completion of 
this study. It is the author's opinion that three factors were decisive in 
influencing all segments of the community to vote "yes" in the refer-
endum. They were: 
1. The MARTA Board of Directors succeeded in making the Fulton 
County officials feel that they were an integral part of the 
decision-making process. 
2. Board members placed more emphasis on community participa-
tion in the decision-making process than was true before 1968. 
This strategy caused members of the Citizens' Transportation 
Advisory Committee who represented all economic classes to 
carry the campaign for rapid transit to all segments of the Fulton 
County Community. 
3. Board members unanimously decided that a community relations 
campaign of much greater intensity than the one leading up to 
the 1968 referendum was a "must" in the black community. It 
cannot be overemphasized that the campaign was centered around 
the eye-catching one-cent sales tax and the seven year fifteen-cent 
fare guarantee which was promised by MARTA officials. Many 
Metro-Atlanta citizens viewed this tax and fare as an economic 
blessing because this arrangement will mean a savings of sixty 
cents per day for poor blacks and whites. For middle and upper 
class blacks and whites, however, the issue of a one cent sales 
tax was a bigger drawing card because it is much more acceptable 
to this segment of the population than an ad valorem property 
tax which was the method proposed for financing a rapid transit 
system in the 1968 referendem. Undoubtedly, therefore, the 
38 Maurice Fliess, "Confusion Widespread As Transit Tax Starts," The Atlanta 
Constitution, April 2, 1972, p. lA. 
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Board's decision to carry out an intensive campaign which stressed 
the one-cent sales tax and the fifteen-cent fare for seven years, 
was very instrumental in causing a significant percentage of the 
Fulton County voters to approve the proposed system. 
It is the author's opinion that black leaders in the Metro-Atlanta 
area and in other areas where rapid transit is being proposed should do 
all they can to guard against uncertainties such as those that appeared 
following approval of the 1971 Atlanta Referendum. Moreover, poor 
blacks and whites in other cities should take a close look at the Atlanta 
experience before they perform their civic responsibility at the polls 
regarding a rapid transit system. They should also demand clear answers 
from their leaders if they are to avoid uncertainties that could crop up 
after their votes have been cast, uncertainties that could work to their 
disadvantage . 
